ABSTRACT The advent of next-generation networks, such as fifth-generation cellular wireless (5G), has transformed every aspect of our lives and promised improvement for various real-life applications. Recently, Liu and Wang proposed a dynamic quantum private comparison protocol that utilizes the property of single photon, in both polarization and spatial-mode degrees of freedom. The protocol is intended to compare the private information of any two parties in n parties with the support of the other n-2 parties. However, we show that their protocol is not secure against a particular strategy of collusion attacks that leads to the problem of information leakage. Therefore, this paper suggests a security enhancement against the proposed attack strategy trying to overcome the security limitation of Liu and Wang's work. The security analysis of the suggested improvement proved that the modified protocol is secure against both the internal and external attacks, which could be used to control the various auction models for 5G services as wireless network virtualization in a secure way.
I. INTRODUCTION
The progress of quantum communication and cryptography has emerged in numerous fields since the first quantum keydistribution (QKD) has been published [1] , since QKD is capable of achieving the unconditional security through the principles of quantum mechanics [2] - [4] . QKD or quantum cryptography is used for generating a shared secretkey between two authorized parties, e.g., Alice and Bob, who have a connection via an authenticated channel and a quantum channel [1] , [5] - [10] . In the last years, the success of demonstrating QKD protocols has contributed considerably to the development of quantum devices [11] - [15] . Also, many famous branches of quantum cryptography have been developed rapidly, including quantum secure direct communication [19] - [24] , quantum teleportation [16] - [18] , quantum key agreement [25] - [29] , quantum secret sharing [30] - [38] , quantum dialogue [39] - [43] , quantum private query [44] , [45] , quantum anonymous ranking [46] , quantum anonymous voting [47] , quantum oblivious transfer [48] - [51] , quantum private comparison (QPC) [52] , [53] and others.
QPC protocol based on Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen states has been discussed initially in [52] . The objective of QPC protocols is to allow two or more parties to decide whether their private information is identical or not, without violating data privacy. In [52] , a third party (TP) is utilized to generate the initial states and announce the comparison result. Generally, TP is considered after Lo [54] pointed out that it is impossible to achieve the comparison function securely. Accordingly, the trustworthiness of the TP has been divided into three types [53] , [55] , [56] : (1) Dishonest TP. According to this type, all parties cannot trust TP. As a result, any multiparty QPC protocol is equal to the two party QPC protocol without TP. This situation has been proved insecure by Lo [54] . (2) Honest TP. In this case, each party only needs to perform one-time pad encryption to her/his VOLUME 7, 2019 This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 License. For more information, see http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/ private secret to transmit it to TP, then TP compares parties' secrets and announces the comparison result. Yet, it is arduous to find an honest TP in real life. (3) Semi-honest TP. In [53] , [55] , and [56] , the semi-honest TP is defined into two kinds of assumptions. The first definition is that TP performs the processes of the protocol loyally, registers all the results of computations, and might try to eavesdrop on the parties' private secrets but not allowed to conspire with other parties. The second definition is that TP may misbehave on its own (sometimes called as an almost-dishonest TP) [58] , yet he cannot conspire with any party. Without difficulty, the semi-honest TP is the most reasonable model. Furthermore, Sun et al. [57] proposed a secured QPC protocol with another adversary model where the TP is malicious, in which the TP may execute the protocol at his/her wishes for learning further information. Recently, Hung et al. [58] proposed a QPC protocol with two TPs, the first TP is malicious and his role is to announce the final comparison result, while the second TP monitors the first one and detect whether the first TP announces a correct comparison result or not. In 2017, Liu et al. [59] presented a QPC protocol with an almost-fully-dishonest TP, their protocol can carry out lower communication complexity using single-photons interference. Subsequently, many other QPC protocols have been proposed for improving both the security of QPC protocol [57] , [60] and the qubit efficiency [52] , [61] , [62] to correctly work under noise [63] , [64] . QPC protocols can be used for novel and exciting applications, including voting [80] , bidding [81] , and auctions [82] to meet the requirements of the rapid development of next generation mobile networks (5G) [83] , [84] . Next generation mobile networks require substantive flexibility and reliability to scale up the capacity of enormous data transmission. The primary reasons for achieving this scaling are to improve the provided services to the connected users, reduction of end-to-end service discontinuation and decreasing the cost of maintenance. Therefore, the service provider (SP) has to improve resource utilization and obtain extra income simultaneously. This can achieve by implementing various auction approaches to allow SP to determine the set of their aspired resources and comparable bid amounts without distinguishing the prices of other buyers. The private comparison protocol is employed since the whole process of bidding and auction require that the submitted preferences and information be private and the SP to determine the winner without knowing the bidding details of other buyers [85] .
The first multiparty quantum private comparison (MQPC) protocol allows n parties to compare whether the secret inputs of any two parties are identical or not has been investigated in [65] . Hereafter, several MQPC protocols have been proposed in [55] , [58] , and [66] - [71] . Recently, Liu and Wang [72] introduced an interesting dynamic MQPC protocol based on single photon in both polarization and spatial-mode-degrees of freedom (PSMDF), where two parties of n(n ≥ 4) parties can conclude the comparison result of their private inputs with the assistance of others n − 2 parties and a semi-honest party. They claimed that dishonest parties could not recover any information about the others' private information. However, we have determined the incorrectness of this claim since a dishonest party can collude with another one to eavesdrop on the private information of an honest party, without being detected. Therefore, this paper proposes an enhanced secure version of the Liu-Wang protocol to prevent the attacker to gain any information about the transmitted messages.
This article is organized as follows. In Section II, a review of Liu-Wang protocol is introduced. In Section III, the cryptanalysis of Liu-Wang protocol is presented. In Section IV, the suggested improvement in Liu-Wang protocol is discussed. Finally, Section V concludes the paper.
II. REVIW OF THE LIU-WANG PROTOCOL [72]
Liu and Wang proposed a MQPC protocol for comparing the private information of n(n ≥ 4) parties with a semi-honest party by using a single photon state (|φ = |φ P ⊗ |φ S ) in both PSMDF. The TP in the Liu-wang protocol performs the processes of the protocol loyally, registers all the results of computations, and might try to eavesdrop on the parties' private secrets but not allowed to conspire with other parties. Here |φ P is the single-photon state in polarization and |φ S is the spatial-mode degrees of freedom.
where H and V represent horizontal-polarization and vertical-polarization of the single photons, respectively.
|S P and |A P are the polarization of the states S and A, respectively. Also,
where a 1 and a 2 denote the upper spatial-mode and the lowerspatial mode of single particles, respectively. |s S and |a S are the spatial-mode degrees of freedom of the states s and a, respectively. By assuming that the two unitary operations for each degree of freedom of single photons are the same in [20] and [21] ,
Using the above four unitary operations, we can obtain: U P |H = |V , U P |V = − |H ,
Now, assume that there are n parties (n ≥ 4),
In the Liu-Wang protocol, any two parties of n parties can compare their secrets with the assistance of other n − 2 parties. Also, n parties can dynamically join the protocol, before the quantum states are measured, for comparing their private information. All parties agree that I P , I S , |H , |S P , |a 1 and |S S encode 0, and U P , U S , |V , |A P , |a 2 and |a S encode 1, respectively. Liu-Wang protocol is divided into two sub-protocols. Firstly, sub-protocol 1 describes how n parties get the comparison result of their secrets. Secondly, sub-protocol 2 describes the mechanism for how n parties can join dynamically in the private comparison protocol. Since the process of the two subprotocols (see Fig. 1 ) is similar except for joining additional n parties in the second sub-protocol, therefore, we review only the first sub-protocol as an illustrative example of the security limitation of Liu-Wang protocol as follows;
(1) P 1 (P 2,··· , P n ) splits his binary representation of
single photons and generates L single photons. Each photon is randomly determined from one of the eight quantum states |φ = |φ P + |φ S or |ψ = |ψ P + |ψ S , where |φ P ∈ {|H , |V }, |φ S ∈ {|a 1 , |a 2 } and |ψ P ∈ {|S P , |A P }, |ψ S ∈ {|s S , |a S }. TP then stores the coding of sequence S q TP and denotes the coding sequence by 
According to the measurements of L and its initial states, P 1 and TP can compute the error rate. If the error rate is higher than a specified threshold, P 1 terminates the protocol and starts again from step (1). Otherwise, P 1 continues to the next step. (4) P 1 discards L from S q TP and obtains S q TP . As per his private information,
on the jth photon of sequence S q TP generating a new sequence S q P 1 that is consistent with step (2), P 1 generates L single photons and inserts them into S q P 1 producing S q P 1 . P 1 transmits S q P 1 and the positions (Po 1 ) of L to P 1 . (5) After P 2 (P 3 , · · · , P n ) receives S q P 1 (S q P2 , · · · , S q Pn−1 ), P 2 (P 3 , · · · , P n ) selects L single photons and measures them with one of the eight bases {|H ⊗ |a 1 , |H ⊗ |a 2 , |V ⊗ |a 1 , |V ⊗ |a 2 , |S P ⊗ |s S , |S P ⊗ |a S , |A P ⊗ |s S , |A P ⊗ |a S }. According to the measurements of L and its initial states, P 2 (P 3 , · · · , P n ) and TP can compute the error rate. If the error rate is higher than a specified threshold, P 1 terminates the protocol and restarts from step (1). Otherwise, P 2 (P 3 , · · · , P n ) proceeds to the next step.
, and acquires S q P 1 (S q P2 ,··· , S q P n−1 ). P 2 (P 3 , · · · , P n ) applies, according to his private information
on the jth photon of sequence S q P 1 (S q P2 ,··· , S q P n−1 ) generating a new sequence S q P 2 (S q P3 ,··· , S q Pn ) that is consistent with step (2), P n generates L single photons and inserts them into S q Pn producing S q Pn . P n transmits S q Pn and the positions (Po n ) of L to TP. (7) Upon receiving S q Pn and Po n , TP and P n use the same process as step (2) to determine whether the quantum channel is attacked or not. If so, they terminate the protocol and begin from step (1). Otherwise, TP measures S q Pn using the correct bases and obtains the result R.
(8) With the assistance of the TP and others n − 2 parties, any P k can respectively compare his secret information with P h , here k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} and h = 1, 2, . . . , k − 1, k + 1, 1, . . . , n. Fork = 1, 2, . . . , n, and for h = 1, 2, . . . , k −1, k +1, 1, . . . , n: TP transfers the result R to P j (j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n, }, j = k, h). Subsequently, n − 2 parties compute;
Thenceforth, they transfer
to TP.
Finally, TP computes
For k = 1, 2, . . . , n, and for h = 1, 2, . .
For example, assume there are four parties (e.g. P 1 , P 2 , P 3 and P 4 ). Each party has a private information M i (e.g. M 1 = {1, 0}, M 2 = {0, 0}, M 3 = {0, 1}, M 4 = {0, 0}) and they want to compare its equality. Also, each party splits his binary representation into L 2 groups. Now, each party has only one group contains two classical bits (i.e. G 1 1 = {10}, G 2 1 = {00}, G 3 1 = {01}, G 4 1 = {00}). All the parties and the TP agree that I P , I S , |H , |S P , |a 1 and |S S encode 0, U P , U S , |V , |A P , |a 2 and |a S encode 1. As indicating in Table 1 , assume that the initial state of the TP is |V |a 2 , and encodes 11. All parties apply the unitary operations, corresponding to their private information, to the initial state and obtain a new state; 
III. INSECRITY OF LIU-WANG'S PROTOCOL
Liu and Wang [72] showed that their protocol is secured against several types of external attacks (e.g. the interceptresend attack and the entangle-measure attack) when performing eavesdropper checking process (or the decoy photon technique [73] ) in steps (3), (5) and (7) . Also, Liu and Wang showed that their protocol is safe against two cases of the participant attack: Firstly, a dishonest party tries to learn the private information of an honest party; Secondly, assume that the TP tries to discover the private information of every participant. Furthermore, participant's collusion attack is an illegal collaboration of two or more dishonest parties to cheat the private information of one or more parties. Indeed, collusion attack is one of the most powerful attacks which represents a real vulnerability to secure multiparty computation and should get more interest [74] - [77] .
In this study, a new type of collusion attack can be performed on Liu-Wang's protocol by two dishonest parties to steal the private information of an honest party (see Fig. 2 ). Similar strategies of collusion attack have been investigated and addressed in [33] , [34] , and [77] - [79] . In Liu-Wang's protocol, the S q TP sequence prepared by TP is transmitted among n parties (P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P n ). P 1 encodes his private information
to the sequence S q TP by applying unitary operations U 1 P ⊗ U 2 S . Additionally, for checking the security of the quantum channel between P 1 and P 2 , P 1 inserts L single photons into S q TP . After that, P 1 transmits the new generated sequence to P 2 . Moreover, P 2 , P 3 , · · · , P n applies the same process as P 1 until TP receives the operated sequence from P n . Therefore, every quantum channel is checked by the two parties themselves, and TP checks the TP − P 1 quantum channel and TP − P n quantum channel. The insecurity of Liu-Wang's protocol derived from that a collusion attack may be executed by two dishonest parties P i and P i+2 for eavesdropping the private information of P i+1 (for i = 1, 2, · · · , n − 2) without being detected. In this situation, we consider two cases to represent the honesty of P i+1 .
Case 1 (P i+1 Is an Honest Party):
By assuming that there are four parties P 1 , P 2 , P 3 , P 4 and the two dishonest parties P 1 and P 3 may collaborate to eavesdrop on P 2 's secret. The attack strategy of P 1 and P 3 is as follows (see also Table 2 ). Initially, P 1 prepares a fake sequence S q F of L 2 single photons and generates L where each photon produced randomly in one of the eight quantum states indicated in step (2) . Also, P 1 transmits the initial state information to P 3 . According to step (3), after TP and P 1 confirm that the transmission of S q TP is secure, P 1 holds S q TP and inserts L single photons into S q F producing S q F . P 1 sends S q F to P 2 instead of the original sequence (later P 1 applies his unitary operation on the original S q TP sequence). Upon receiving S q F , P 1 and P 2 check the security of the quantum channel using L . Besides, P 2 discards the measured L single photons to retrieve S q F . After verifying the security of transmission, P 2 applies his unitary operations U 1 P ⊗U 2 S on the jth photon of S q F sequence according to G 2 j producing S q FP 2 . Actually, P 2 honestly performs his process because he ignores that he has received a fake sequence. Afterward, P 2 prepares L single photons and inserts them into S q FP 2 , producing S q FP 2 , and sends S q FP 2 to P 3 .
Upon receiving S q FP 2 , P 2 and P 3 check the security of the transmission using the L single photons. If the transmission of S q FP 2 is secure; P 3 discards the measured L single photons to retrieve S q FP 2 . Subsequently, P 3 starts to measure S q FP 2 with the correct initial state information which was sent by P 1 and obtains the result denoted by MR FP 2 . Therefore, P 1 and P 3 can easily get P 2 's unitary operation (i.e. G 2 j ) since they know MR FP 2 and the initial state information of S q FP 2 . To continue the protocol without being detected, P 3 applies the recovered unitary operation of P 2 and his unitary operation on P 1 's state producing a new state and sends the evolved states to next party. For example, as shown in Table 3 (a), (b), (c), or (d), P 1 sends |H |a 2 , − |H |a 1 , |V |a 2 , or − |V |a 1 to P 3 , respectively. Then, P 3 applies the recovered unitary operation of P 2 and his unitary operation on |ϕ P1 producing ϕ P 3 and sends the evolved state to P 4 .
Case 2 (P i+1 and P i+3 Are Dishonest Parties): In this case, the dishonest party P i+1 can utilize the same suggested attack strategy and collude with P i+3 for eavesdropping the private information of P i+2 . Therefore, P i+1 prepares a fake sequence S q FP i+1 of L 2 single photons. Next, P i+1 transmits the fake sequence S q FP i+1 and corresponding initial information to P i+3 . Hence, Liu-Wang's protocol is secured against our suggested attack strategy, since P i , P i+2 , and all other VOLUME 7, 2019 TABLE 3. Sections (A), (B), (C), and (D) show all the possible evolved states when P 1 sends H a 2 , − H a 1 , V a 2 , and − V a 1 to P 3 , respectively.
TABLE 3. (Continued.) Sections (A), (B), (C), and (D)
show all the possible evolved states when P 1 sends H a 2 , − H a 1 , V a 2 , and − V a 1 to P 3 , respectively.
dishonest parties try to recover the private information from fake sequences of photons.
IV. LIU-WANG PROTOCOL'S IMPROVEMENT
In Liu-Wang's protocol, the prepared sequence of L 2 single photons is transmitted from TP to P 1 , and the security of transmission is guaranteed by L single photons. P 1 encodes his private information into the received sequence by performing certain unitary operations. Also, P 1 inserts new L single photons into the received sequence and sends the operating sequence to the next party. This process continues until P n encodes his private information and sends them to the TP. In fact, the quantum channel between every two parties is independently checked by the two parties themselves. Consequently, this process may enable a dishonest party from colluding with another dishonest party for stealing the private information of an honest party. For solving this security issue, we suggest a simple modification as follows.
Using QKD protocol [1] , TP shares secret keys
· · · , K n with P 1 , P 2,··· , P n , respectively; and the lengths of these secret keys are the same as the private information of parties (i.e.
The suggested modification is performed on both steps (1 * ) and (8 * ), and the other steps will remain the same.
(1 * )P i (TP) splits his binary representation of
).
(8 * ) With the assistance of TP and others n − 2 parties, any P k can respectively compare his secret with P h , here k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} and h = 1, 2, . . . , k − 1, k + 1, 1, . . . , n. For k = 1, 2, . . . , n, and for h = 1, 2, . . . , k − 1, k + 1, 1, . . . , n: TP transfers the result R to P j (j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n, }, j = k, h). Subsequently, n − 2 parties compute;
So, if the dishonest parties (P i and P i+2 ) attempt to apply the suggested attack strategy, they obtain an encrypted information of P i+1 , i.e. C i+1 = K i+1 ⊕ M i+1 . Therefore, the dishonest parties P i and P i+2 cannot retrieve any private information of P i+1 (for i = 1, 2, · · · , n − 2).
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have investigated the security limitations of Liu and Wang quantum private comparison protocol. We have VOLUME 7, 2019 developed an improvement of Liu and Wang protocol to prevent dishonest parties from eavesdropping the private information of honest parties. Our proposed modifications show that the dishonest parties cannot retrieve any private information about the transmitted message when applying a collusion attack. This opens a new area for developing potential future secure multiparty computation applications and to improve the provided services and resource utilization of next generation mobile networks to the connected users. 
